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Attention regarding the energy saving potential of existing houses has been occurring within the UK for a
number of decades, producing an evolving landscape of policy mechanisms. Experience shows that
innovative schemes are required, implemented at a large scale, to reach carbon reduction targets. In an
unprecedented move within the UK, private industry was enlisted with the task of delivering the most
recent domestic energy efﬁciency policy; the Green Deal (GD). This policy required the energy efﬁciency
retroﬁt services (EERS) sector to increase capacity and deliver efﬁciency improvements to the UK's
existing housing stock, at scale. This review evaluates this Green Deal policy landscape in relation to the
requirement of EERS sector expansion. Previous UK retroﬁt policies act as comparative exemplars, to
assess how policy is progressing in promoting private enterprises. Key ﬁndings suggest EERS expansion is
most successful if policies are designed more holistically; UK policies show strategies which focus on
simply the property and not the occupants have their disadvantages. Therefore, a move away from
marginal ﬁnancial incentives, such as the Green Deal's loan structure, to a wider consideration of how
policy tools interact with supply chains and end users, would enable increased impact.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Domestic energy efﬁciency and the ability for tenants and home
owners to live comfortably and affordably have been long standing
foundation stones in the energy policy discourse. These factors
have taken on enhanced importance as calls for heightened sus-
tainability; economic activity and energy security have ampliﬁed.
From a sustainability perspective, the built environment is esti-
mated to use 37% of all energy consumed within the UK (2013) [1].
As the largest area of energy consumption, the Group of 8 (G8)
countries have determined built environment energy efﬁciency
improvements to not only be cost efﬁcient but also substantial in
having the potential to save 8.2 GTCO2 per year, by 2030 [2]. This
reduction in carbon emissions via an increase in energy efﬁciency is
necessary to meet the UK's target of an 80% carbon reduction from
1990 levels by 2050 [1].
Many supporters retain that increasing domestic property en-
ergy efﬁciency via private sector delivery channels will meet sus-
tainability and economic growth targets simultaneously [3]. Tor Ltd. This is an open access articlemeet these targets, capacity expansionwithin the Energy Efﬁciency
Retroﬁt Services (EERS) sector is required, involving the assurance
that equipment, materials, production processes, investment, and
the skills base are in place to absorb demand [46]. This challenge
of increasing capacity is obviously a complex task; composed of
numerous hurdles. To assist the advancement and growth of the
EERS sector, governments intervene to accelerate rates of change
via policy interventions. This research assesses the impact of UK
policymechanisms utilised during the recent past, to determine the
ways in which barriers encumbering the EERS sector, to deliver
retroﬁt at scale were brought down. This research does not claim to
be comprehensive, but instead aims to be exploratory in high-
lighting speciﬁc effects from past policy mechanisms, and details
key areas where the EERS sector beneﬁtted or was hindered by the
policy.2. EERS sector activities
The EERS sector encompasses numerous activities from the
design of refurbishment schemes, to the installation and ongoing
maintenance of energy efﬁcient equipment and materials. The
stakeholders operating within the sector are wide ranging and
include; contractors, designers, trades people and architects. Inunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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EERS sector speciﬁcally and its policy interaction, mainly due to the
sector being previously identiﬁed as a sub-division of the general
construction industry [7].2.1. The EERS sector within an evolving policy landscape
In providing retroﬁt measures to increase carbon savings within
the UK housing stock, the EERS sector is aiming to reduce the en-
ergy efﬁciency gap; the difference between potential carbon sav-
ings and savings which are actually realised [8]. Therefore, in
designing policy to increase the level of energy efﬁciency upgrades,
mechanisms are needed to effectively limit barriers to retroﬁt at
scale and in turn the extent of the gap [9,10]. These barriers have
been detailed extensively in existing literature and cover all areas
from building heterogeneity, to business approach, to the behav-
iour of end users and the assessment of energy usage [1115]. For
this research the barriers of interest are those which are deemed by
the literature to directly impact the supply chain, and inhibit EERS
sector businesses from increasing capacity. In particular this
research is focused on assessing the barriers which can inhibit
retroﬁt processes prior to any end users being involved, thus, they
are the barriers which are contained within supply chain inability,
or the negative operational conditions within which businesses
operate.3. Policy schemes
This section provides an overview of the key UK energy policies
to identify how expectations of the EERS sector have varied. These
policies include the Green Deal (GD) and its sister policy the Energy
Company Obligation (ECO) [16] and the precursor policies; the
Carbon Emission Reduction Target (CERT) and Community Energy
Saving Programme (CESP) [17]. Therefore, the mix of policy covers
obligatory schemes utilising energy supplier funding and also
schemes aimed at private home owners and housing associations.
These schemes involved the allocation of differing amounts of
ﬁnancial input (Table 1), amounts which are important to consider
when discussing policy impact. Throughout this research, these
differences in cost will be referred to, to support ﬁndings in the
level of effectiveness of each scheme.
Table 1 shows that due to the obligatory nature of ECO and CERT,
and the fact that they operated at such a large scale, CO2 savings per
year were much higher in comparison to CESP which operated on a
smaller scale, and the GD which did not have an obligatory aspect.
The table also shows that both CERT and CESP achieved the most
cost effective ways in which to save carbon, in comparison to ECO
which placed a high requirement on energy companies to retroﬁt
more vulnerable households, which required increased resources
per retroﬁt, and the GD, which required increased ﬁnance to recruit
loan applicants. These increases in requirements of scheme
administration cause ECO to cost £61 per tonne CO2 saved and £150
per tonne CO2 saved for the GD.Table 1
Policy cost comparison.





(Figures originating within DECC National Audit Ofﬁce, Green Deal and Energy Compan3.1. Carbon emissions reduction target (CERT)
From 2008 to 2012, CERT was positioned as one of the UK's
primary energy efﬁciency policy tools. CERT placed monetary ob-
ligations (Table 1) upon energy suppliers to reduce customer car-
bon emissions via retroﬁt measures. 60% of savings had to be
achieved via insulation measures, and the remaining 40% of carbon
savings needed to focus on energy savings within priority groups
(low income, elderly households) [17]. CERT development grew
from a technical base, emphasizing the take up of carbon saving
measures. This produced a policy which was focused and achiev-
able, with a high degree of stakeholder consultation, particularly
with suppliers [19]. In addition to the policy focus, transparency
and target setting offered policy clarity, and contributed to success
in delivering high volumes of energy saving measures [20].3.2. Community energy saving programme (CESP)
CESP was a scheme funded via energy company obligations,
aimed at providing funding to community groups, housing associ-
ations and local authorities to improve property energy efﬁciency.
CESP emphasised a whole house approach, treating properties
street by street [21]. During the operational periods of 2009e2012,
the scheme, alongside CERT, ﬁnanced almost 100 community ini-
tiatives, resulting in 90,000 individual property retroﬁts. The
impact of the scheme meant that in a post retroﬁt assessment, 75%
of participant's agreed that their property was warmer and took
less time and energy to heat to comfortable levels [22]. The CESP
delivery model focused on creating partnerships and schemes
which were locally speciﬁc, offering a method of increasing the rate
of localised energy savings particularly within deprived areas. This
local emphasis meant that the delivery model focused primarily on
the economies of scale which could be generated on large social
housing estates for instance [20].3.3. Green Deal (GD)
Operational from late 2012/early 2013 to July 2015, the GD
permitted bill payers to retroﬁt their properties with energy saving
measures, without the need for any upfront payments [16,23,24], as
loans were secured against the property. This meant homeowners
and tenants could save energywithout the need to take on personal
debt [16] . Repayments for the retroﬁt upgrades were generated via
on bill payments post installation [25]. The GD relied upon ‘the
Golden Rule’ to ensure that the value of any energy saving gener-
ated by the improvements, was no less than the repayments for the
measures [26]. The delivery, management and ﬁnancing of the GD
was placed in the hands of the private sector. A consortium made
up of banks, businesses, local authorities and investors took on the
responsibility of ﬁnance provision [3]. Plus, during the early stages
of the policy, the Government offered cash back incentives to early
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ECO operated alongside the GD in aiming to tackle carbon saving
and fuel poverty simultaneously. ECO ﬁtted in with the GD by of-
fering measures that do not meet the Golden Rule assessment;
positioning ECO to deliver measures which are less cost effective
[27]. Additionally, ECO's design is structured to provide high cost
measures to low income households, or those in fuel poverty [26].
The two policies were linked via the method of delivery as the
private businesses providing the services had the potential to be
the same organisations, with the ability to bundle additional
measures on top of an ECO funded package (Table 1) and process
this addition as a GD energy efﬁciency improvement [24]. Providers
gained ‘jobs’ by bidding on brokerage auctions fortnightly to win
‘lots’ of ECO retroﬁt projects, sold by the energy companies [28,29].
The initial ECO model was unprecedented within UK policy
design, and therefore contained some initial issues. Firstly, as the
scheme prioritised hard to treat properties with solid wall insu-
lation, and cavity wall measures, there was a knock on effect in the
relative restrictions in other areas of the market [30] . Secondly, in
focussing on high cost measures, which inherently require greater
obligation funding (Table 1), ECO applied a lot of pressure on
businesses supplying solid wall insulation and cavity wall insu-
lation to grow in capacity at a fast pace [31]. Thirdly, research
indicated that the proposed impact of ECOwas too limited. By 2023,
ECO was anticipated to remove 125,000e150,000 households from
fuel poverty, a number which was 20e40 times too small to tackle
the problem [32]. Meaning that ECO could have actually been in
place, while there was a 29% increase in fuel poverty [33].
3.5. Transition to GD and ECO, impacts upon the EERS sector
Due to the fact the GD was designed to be ﬁnanced, managed
and delivered by the private sector, with a removal of signiﬁcant
public funding (Table 1) the development of the supply chain was
key [5]. The estimations within the GD's impact assessment places
the EERS sector in a difﬁcult position, as the expectation was for a
signiﬁcant growth in capacity, knowledge and business capabilities,
within a short period. With this level of required capacity increase
in mind, details of how present and past policies have assisted
businesses in overcoming barriers, follows.
4. Methodology
4.1. Policy learning via comparative analysis
The concept of policy making is one that has been stated to be
viewed and understood as a learning process [34], for ofﬁcial
employed policy makers or by social actors within general society.
This idea based learning is opposed to conﬂict based progress,
whereby policy changes are brought about by pressure from soci-
ety, regarding distaste with a speciﬁc policy instrument or para-
digm. With idea based learning or policy learning however, there is
the option to look deeper at present policy and produce via com-
parison, a more informed environment [35]. Furthermore the
process of policy learning to create ideas offers the opportunity to
learn not just about differing policy models, but also about differing
structures for decision making, processes, aims and innovations
[36]. From this therefore it can be seen that policy learning not only
serves the purpose of identifying process and policy innovations,
but also provides a method of determining how the lessons resul-
tant from the learning process can be brought into action [37].
Utilising a comparative analysis framework provides an insight
into differing ways of working that are concealed by the differing
organisational, cultural and societal structures within which theyoperate [38]. Therefore, a comparative assessment between retroﬁt
policy mechanisms, based on Rose [32,38] and also Murphy et al.,
[29] who utilise a comparison of retroﬁt policies across differing
countries, generates a base of evidence to develop ideas fromwhich
policy progress can result. This approach advocated by Rose, re-
quires the isolation of differing elements of a policy, but without
the intricate description of the ways in which the policy mecha-
nisms operate.
From this therefore, within this research the speciﬁc policies of
the GD, ECO, CERT and CESP have been selected, which are
considered to offer an abundant evidence base, and are chosen due
to their signiﬁcant policy documentation and shared geographic
areas of impact and policy aims, all factors considered key for
comparison to Rose [32]. Sources utilised for the assessment of the
policies against the barriers outlined above, include peer-reviewed
academic papers, plus government and industry reports
[16,19,22,20,39].
4.2. Assessment criteria
EERS sector business strategy and formation to maximise
retroﬁt scale potential, is the focus of this research. Therefore the
key barriers under assessment are those which detail, business
operation strategies and supply chain formation. The speciﬁc se-
lection of barriers for assessment against the four policies has taken
place via a literature review, further details of which and a break-
down of differing barriers under consideration is available in
Gooding and Gul [40] with additional details in Britnell and Dixon
[41]; Decanio [11]; Gooding and Gul [42]; Lowery et al. [43] and
Mundaca [14]. Via this review the following shortlist (Table 2) has
been produced, whereby all the factors have the power to limit the
amount of the effective formation and performance of EERS sector
businesses. The table details these barriers and looks at the impacts
of the barriers and requirements to lessen the barriers negative
impacts.
Utilising existing literature and policy documents, the differing
policies are now assessed in terms of whether these barriers
(Table 2) are removed, remain in place, or are partially tackled, a
rating relating to these levels is then applied to the policies. The
scores for the policies are informed via literature and policy doc-
uments, and ranks policies lowest if there is no comment on spe-
ciﬁc barrier removal, secondly if the barrier is commented on in
documentation, thirdly if the policy explicitly speciﬁes overtly
methods to remove barriers, and fourthly if the policy explicitly
speciﬁes methods to remove barriers and has created related pos-
itive results. With these scorings, this method seeks to compare
policies in an exploratory way and detect innovative policy
thinking, where learning can take place.
5. Level of policy success in aiding the growth of the EERS
sector
5.1. Business relationships with end users
The barrier of a lack of awareness or tailored information de-
tailing domestic energy efﬁciency, due to ineffective business/end
user relationships, can lead to limited uptake of policy measures
and a poor business/client relationship. This can then produce
hindrances to the EERS sector in gaining customers and issuing
successful marketing campaigns and business development
schemes. Without information designed for speciﬁc groups,
imperfect informationwill result, with end users misinformed [48],
andmotivation to take up retroﬁt services remaining low. Therefore
if an EERS sector business is to be successful in its pathway to
gaining business, information issued to the client needs to be
Table 2
Barriers limiting EERS sector growth.
Business relationships with end users The need for correct business formation to be able to form a successful relationship with the end user. Without correct
formation this barrier impacts the level of business available for completion due to ineffective information being issued to the
customer and resultant awareness being low. Research suggests that households in the process of undertaking retroﬁt work
had a greater awareness of retroﬁt beneﬁts, including money saving and thermal comfort, when compared to those who are
not planning retroﬁt work [44].
Business hidden costs or transaction costs DeCanio [11], states that hidden costs, or transaction costs, are key factors hampering the growth of businesses. Hidden costs
occur in various forms, from the cost of sourcing information, setting up the supply chain, to gaining business contracts [45].
These processes detract from the level of proﬁt achievable and therefore limit investment channels. For a capacity increase in
the EERS sector and for new business enterprises to establish there is a need for policy to generate ﬁnancial conditions
limiting the risk to investors, and providing arenas to encourage innovation developments in products and processes [45].
Business organisational barriers For new or expanding EERS sector businesses, there is the need to identify niches and predict downstream capacity and
potential future competition, along with developing innovations, problem solving and an awareness of respective roles
within an integrated delivery team. Without policy mechanisms to offer this organisational market structure, it will be
difﬁcult to create a competitive sector compared to existing more traditional construction and refurbishment markets.
Barriers limiting the opportunity for
innovation
Low carbon housing retroﬁt is a singular solution which can address wider problems of fuel poverty, climate change, and
energy security [46]. Therefore, understanding how retroﬁt could operate with differing systems and projects, may lead to
innovation and streamlining, enhancing the viability of retroﬁt opportunities [47]. Generating conditions which foster
increased understanding of the need for innovative products and processes may lead to high delivery efﬁciency and
proﬁtability.
Business inability to remove inertia and
entrenched routines
Entrenched routines and habits cause issues of energy inefﬁciency to be simply ignored [15]. Without the provision of
mechanisms and incentive from EERS sector businesses to remove inertia, even the most appealing policy instruments may
be ignored.
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savings from installed measures, transparent in terms of agree-
ments between business and client, and also free, to ensure that all
types of households have equal access to the possibility of retroﬁt
works [49]. Additionally, end users may be limited in their enthu-
siasm for energy efﬁciency information and therefore may only
take in certain media formats detailing housing retroﬁt, and not
search out differing data sources [15,50]. This means that for this
barrier to be overcome, policy needs to work with supply chain
actors (section 2.1) to ensure that information is well detailed,
highly available, and consistent.
The GD and ECO did go some way to enhance demand and
generate increased awareness, via building good quality relation-
ships with end users. Within the GD policy documentation, the
intentionwas to be focused and structured around the needs of the
consumer and businesses [51]. The reasoning for this is to guar-
antee a widespread uptake of retroﬁt measures, with the corre-
sponding supply chain to meet demand. Policy documentation
stated that all GD providers and assessors are accredited and
business practitioners act as a ﬁrst port of call for end users; ‘we
anticipate that the involvement of a diverse market of local and na-
tional ﬁrms of all sizes will ﬁnd interested customers more effectively
than any top-down Government scheme [16].’
In theory this model has its merit as the anticipation was that a
customer carrying out standard construction work will have the
opportunity to discuss with trades-people on site the option to
install accompanying energy efﬁciency improvements. This reli-
ance upon commercial actors also means that the policy was
dependent upon private enterprises to provide training and boost
the skills base [16,52]. Both factors are designed to positively in-
ﬂuence domestic energy efﬁciency increases, due to the potential to
boost the penetration of the issue within mainstream construction
activity.
From this review, evidence suggests that government provision
and support to aid awareness generation with the public, was
limited. The assistancewhich was government provided came from
a small fund of money to provide GD cash back ﬁnance to early
adopters [16,51] (Table 1). This fund does indicate that policy had
the intention of driving awareness up, however, for the period
November 2012 to April 2014, the GD Household Tracker survey
only showed a 10% increase in the number of respondents who
were familiar with the GD [53, p15]. The same period also saw a 4%drop in the general awareness of energy saving measures. This is
evidently concerning for the overall aim of private industry
providing a diverse market, which sources customers [53], and also
displays the potential requirement for additional support from
government.
More positively, the Tracker Survey does state that from
November 2012 to April 2014 the awareness of the GD quality mark
did increase from 12% to 23%, showing that awareness of the role of
private businesses and the importance of accredited trades people
grew [53]. This means that overall; the performance of policy in
promoting business ability to generate successful relationships
with end users, via issuing quality information was minimal, with
changes in policy required to be more supportive of the supply
chain [5]. Furthermore, there is a clear indication that the limited
ﬁnancial input within the GD from government has caused limited
impacts in uptake and awareness increases. This reduction of
ﬁnancial assistance within the GD is unprecedented within this
policy arena (Table 1), with the GD being relatively unsupported in
comparison to the other policies under consideration [22 p34,18].
In contrast CERT utilising an increased level of government
ﬁnancial assistance operated a raft of differing mechanisms [18],
both driven by private industry and public agencies, to increase
engagement and information dissemination. Within CERT policy
documentation, interaction with the public, information provision,
and lead generation were intended to be carried out by a combi-
nation of; national advertising by large energy suppliers, Energy
Saving Trust advertising supplemented by a dedicated telephone
line, marketing by retail companies including DIY stores, and door-
knocking by installers [19]. Unlike the GD therefore, the emphasis
on the EERS sector to carry out all lead generation was absent,
meaning the level of policy/business support and cooperation was
increased, via boosted ﬁnancial resources [18]. This enabled a
higher level of barrier removal as an environment was created
where, with good business/client care 35e50% of referrals could be
converted to full retroﬁt installation, and with sustained local
marketing and ﬁnancial support up to 60e70% of customers who
were directly engaged, converted to installation [19, p26]. This
means that the energy company obligatory target was exceeded by
3% for the operational period (April 08-December 12), equating to a
saving of 75 Mt CO2 [54, p4].
CESP on the other hand, with the limited areas within which it
operated (due to being conﬁned to work with communities below
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quality business/end user relationship building which could take
place. Due to the fact suppliers required a certain number of
properties to meet requirements, in the main social housing pro-
viders were used to gain properties, not end users. Although this
produced economies of scale for EERS sector businesses and an
increase in social housing standards, end user behaviour and in-
formation provision was not necessarily being addressed [22]. This
lack of interaction with end users from the commencement of a
project meant that delivery partners required good tenant liaison
skills, along with a pilot home to use as a show home to reassure
end users [22]. The fact that interaction with end users was not
carried out during the entire project schedule also meant that
within the Evaluation of the Community Energy Saving Programme
only 51% of respondents stated that they had received some sort of
instruction as to how to run a home efﬁciently [22, p17]. This
percentage meant that end users felt in general that there was
scope to improve this advice, as with a higher level of education
received, the more signiﬁcantly respondents felt they would have
beneﬁtted, therefore the need for businesses to increase their
methods of communicating with end users was still required.
Furthermore, the survey found that 64% of participants found they
were unsure their heating expenses had reduced post retroﬁt,
enforcing the requirement that an emphasis is needed on education
[22, p18] . Overall therefore, due to the limited business interaction
with members of the public, quality relationship building was
limited, hindering the amount of knowledge transfer and thus
possible energy savings into the future.
5.2. Business hidden costs or transaction costs
Hidden or transaction costs (TCs) are costs related to operational
procedures and therefore can hamper the growth of businesses
[11]. These procedures detract from the level of proﬁt achievable
and therefore limit investment channels. For retroﬁt activities, TCs
result from the processes involved in project preparation, ﬁnance
searching, construction supply chain formation and negotiation,
plus ongoing post project monitoring [45]. Combined, these costs
deter investment in energy efﬁciency measures, as TCs can form
30% of the ﬁnal installed cost of cavity wall insulation, and 10% of
lighting improvements [14]. Even with percentage estimates such
as these however, the level of uncertainty around TCs is still high.
This lack of accuracy is due to a deﬁciency of data regarding tech-
nological performance, data source reliability and the unproven
nature of monitoring and cost quantiﬁcation. The resultant effect of
TCs is that they make emergent processes and technologies pro-
hibitively more expensive than more established alternatives.
For EERS sector businesses, retroﬁt projects can produce
signiﬁcant hidden costs in comparison to the business opportunity
scale [55, 56] . Meaning policy priorities should support effective
market growth and generate ﬁnancial conditions limiting investor
risk and therefore EERS sector business growth.
In comparison to CERT or CESP which focused on low hanging
fruit to meet carbon reduction targets [29], under the GD, busi-
nesses were initially required to provide higher cost solutions [16].
This heightened complexity of delivery meant that the focus on
labour intensive mechanisms such as cavity wall insulation (CWI)
and solid wall insulation (SWI) increased. In focusing on these
technologies, the GD estimated an increase in the number of in-
stallers, and thus a knock-on effect on the wider supply chain [32].
This change of industry formation produced costs to business; to
create GD compliant, proﬁtable and effective business structures
quickly. To reach the UK's carbon reduction targets, 12,000 prop-
erties needed to be retroﬁtted per week from 2014 [57], however,
past statistics of the cavity wall insulation (CWI) industry suggeststhat this is out of reach in the short term.With the highly publically
ﬁnanced CERT scheme pushing the industry, installations grew to
550,000 in 2005 [39]. This growth in scale is positive, but if the CWI
industry is representative of the whole EERS sector, reaching
12,000 properties per week seems ambitious without signiﬁcant
policy assistance and ﬁnancial aid (Table 1).
Nevertheless, in endeavouring to minimise hidden costs
affecting the EERS sector, the GD did create, via accreditation and
quality marks, a risk management framework [58]. This aimed to
strike a balance between protecting customers with ‘red tape’ and
also limiting the commercial administrative load [59]. However,
under the GD, an installer or provider still had to ﬁnance the
standard on-going cost of operating a business, plus the initial cost
of £16 and an annual cost of £8 per GD package to cover the costs of
the GD ﬁnance administration, in addition to the cost of marketing
and sale activities per retroﬁt [60, p70]. Furthermore, within the
supply chain there is the cost of accreditation, assessment and
product certiﬁcation; all these overheads exacerbate the issue of
TCs and hidden costs.
In contrast, ECO's brokerage platform offers installers and pro-
viders a method of alleviating marketing costs and minimising
administration costs. The certainty of supply via ECO creates
favourable conditions for businesses to invest and generate
increased capacity, creating economies of scale, decreasing the
impact of transaction costs. However, although in design the sys-
tem should provide certainty via the brokerage, due to changes
within the policy, activity resultant from the auction mechanism
has been minimal. In December 2013, one auction for instance
produced no sales. This may have been due to the same month
being the time at which energy suppliers had their timings to meet
their obligation doubled [61], meaning for supply chain businesses,
insecurity levels increased. This long term uncertainty shows that
businesses cannot operate unless there are guaranteed conditions
and therefore predictable TCs.
CERT, throughout its operational period produced an environ-
ment of ﬂexibility and stability, which enabled the establishment of
highly cost-effective routes of delivery to satisfy the requirements
from the Ofﬁce of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) and legis-
lation. The scheme created in effect a commodity market by
assigning a price per tonne of carbon saving [19]. The market
encouraged the entry of new enterprises, which in turn reduced
over time the hidden and transaction costs impacting businesses. In
DECC's 2011 evaluation of CERT, feedback from practitioners
enforced this point stating that CERT had been the most cost
effective way of providing carbon savings, when compared to CESP,
in terms of the types of measures installed and related adminis-
tration costs [19].
Nonetheless, CERT did also produce negative impacts upon the
EERS sector delivery network. Firstly, the factor that CERT encour-
aged competition between suppliers and stakeholders, due to the
tight timescales and price margins at work, a lack of transparency
resulted [20]. This absence of information sharing drives trans-
action costs up as knowledge distribution is absent. Secondly, due
to reliance upon the supplier obligation bringing installer's work,
difﬁculties can arise in assigning resources and managing a busi-
ness when peaks and troughs are encountered. Thirdly, the fact that
the market for retroﬁt under CERT caused a distortion in market
value, due to subsidisation meant that some suppliers faced more
difﬁculty than others in gaining ﬁnance. Fourthly, due to the level of
obligation for the suppliers of the retroﬁt schemes, and the
heightened level of uncertainty regarding what retroﬁt measures
were actually included under CERT, some suppliers ended up
providing work for free, to ensure take up and to remove ﬁnancial
penalty risks. Furthermore, as the policy progressed, additional
obligation groups, such as the Priority and Super Priority Groups
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signiﬁcant resources [54].
CESP worked to minimise transaction costs by working with
existing practices, this occurred in multiple ways; present re-
lationships with housing associations and providers were built
upon. To limit costs associated with setting up new working pro-
cedures, existing housing data was utilised to enable a streamlined
method of assessing a project status, and experienced actors from
both housing associations and EERS sector businesses were utilised
to bring knowledge and drive to a project. Plus, CESP was utilised
on existing projects thereby building on previous work to bring
carbon savings [22]. All of these measures reduced the adminis-
tration load and hidden cost impact on EERS sector businesses
associated with growing or setting up an operation.
Nevertheless CESP, in practice did generate signiﬁcant issues for
practitioners. Initially due to a lack of awareness within local au-
thorities and housing associations of CESP and its impacts upon
their activities; the level of guidance and support required was
higher than anticipated at the policy design stages. Once housing
associations had been brought on board with the scheme, the
administration and management of project funding caused further
issues. These problems included the percentage of funding required
by energy companies versus that derived from the property owner
(housing association, council), and also who was liable to ﬁnance
additional works and contingency costs [22]. In the assessment for
the suitability of a project, additional hidden costs were encoun-
tered including those of navigating the large variances in the
quality of housing stock information. Lastly, the scheme also
fostered principal agent relationships whereby delivery partners
perceived a lack of transparency in the practices of the energy
company and a lack of control from the view of the local authority
or housing association [22].
5.3. Organisational barriers
With many EERS sector businesses being classed as micro
businesses [7], the need to identify niches and predict downstream
capacity and potential future competition is important. From this
therefore, it can be appreciated that to encourage growth and
retroﬁt at scale, EERS sector businesses need to adopt organisa-
tional cultures that provide opportunities to innovate, and imple-
ment extensively researched business plans [62].
For the GD and ECO the required organisational cultures
needed to provide measures which created an EERS sector
organised in such a way that growth and proﬁtability were
generated. The policy's practitioner accreditation did aid EERS
sector growth to an extent, meaning issues of a lack of expertise or
knowledge were reduced. Although the accreditation GD stake-
holders received did not extend the level of accreditation within
industry to a large extent, it did consolidate requirements, which
increases the level of end user conﬁdence [16]. EPCs for instance
are an area of regulationwhich the GD utilised, along with already
existing installer accreditation body data, and requirements from
industry for minimum product performance. Accredited advisors
and installers were the only businesses and operatives permitted
to trade under the scheme, creating a limited force on competi-
tion. DECC ﬁnanced and put in place a supervisory body to alle-
viate this issue. From this standpoint, the GD performed in a
manner which did assist the growth of an organised, effective
supply chain, utilising already present factors to minimise nega-
tive impacts on the EERS sector.
The affectivity of the GD and ECO accreditation scheme is
evident, when considering the continuing growth of accredited
organisations. Up until August 2014, the number of individual as-
sessors had steadily grown to 4,219, the number of providersincreasing to 156, and the number of installers rising continuously
to 2735 [63]. This increase in businesses provided a continuing
growth in the variety of services offered and in turn the level of
inter-business competition. Additionally, for EERS sector businesses
involved in product innovation, new products were subject to
higher accreditation costs to enable their entry into the GD's roster
of permitted products. Although these costs limited competition
within the market, the overall effect was one of advancement due
to the increasing size of the market and product roster compared to
previous schemes [60]. However, these measures did not produce
the desired volume of results. In fact from the GD's commencement
in January 2013 to August 2015, just over 12,000 properties were
retroﬁtted and completed [63]. This lack of success may be due to
the fact that in general the GD via the Golden Rule prescribed that
any savings generated by measures must be larger than the ﬁnance
injected into a project. This in turn meant that in reality only low
cost measures qualiﬁed, measures which in the past were delivered
by obligations such as CERT. The difference between the delivery
mechanisms is that with an obligation the outcomes of a scheme
are certain, whereas through the GD the level of delivery was left
entirely up to the EERS sector, meaning greater uncertainty. Plus, in
many cases the types of low cost measures were unsuited to a
ﬁnance loan, as their capital costs were relatively low. From this
therefore the GD needed to optimise the types of measures which
the ﬁnance package catered for. Furthermore, the higher cost
technologies could also be considered as sub optimal due to the
unlikelihood that they would ﬁt into the Golden Rule's calculations.
As it stands therefore, the GD produced a framework of measures
which were not enticing to end users and were not easy to sell.
ECO, via the obligation it places upon energy companies, can
guarantee a certain volume of properties to the EERS sector. This
means that investment in business resources and training schemes
causing growth can occur in an environment where ﬁnancial
returns for business are more assured [64]. In comparison to the 12,
000 properties retroﬁtted under the GD, over the same period, ECO
delivered over 1.5 million measures [63].
CERT on the other hand encouraged the removal of organisa-
tional barriers via the coupling of differing types of organisations,
including installers, merchants and consumer groups. These part-
nerships resulted in the co-development of a supply chain char-
acterised by feedback and continuing progress [20]. Moreover,
cooperative processes, act as promotional methods to encourage
uptake, and without commercial barriers, newmethods of working
were created.
Evidential cases;
- British Gas and Sony partnership to increase household elec-
tronics energy efﬁciency.
- EDF Energy with Ice Energy partnership to deliver heat pumps.
- Lemnis and EDF partnership to delivery low energy light bulbs.
- 24 London boroughs working with housing partners to retroﬁt
50,000 homes.
- Npower, Rockwool and Build Centre partnership to offer
reduced insulation purchase costs for DIY customers [20].
The diversity and innovation within these types of partnerships
is evidently a positive force in ﬁnding new ways to meet the UK's
carbon reduction targets. The success of these schemes was inﬂu-
enced by an already present strong supply chain, offering an early
indication as to the conﬁdence of the delivery method [19]. How-
ever, these successes within the organisation of businesses were
undermined by the way in which CERT created difﬁculties, via the
changing of measures covered by the policy. This fostered a lack of
trust, with investment by businesses reduced to limit risk [19], and
delays incurred to EERS sector expansion.
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structures under CESP was more challenging due to obligated
parties having to gain approvals for retroﬁt work from local au-
thorities. This localised governance of the scheme did not lend itself
to fostering innovative operations as resources were limited.
Furthermore, as CESP projects can only be completed in clearly
deﬁned and constricted areas, the opportunity to streamline
organisational structures was limited.
5.4. Barriers limiting the opportunity for innovation
The extremely heterogeneous nature of the existing housing
stock creates a major barrier to EERS sector companies; ﬁrstly a
high level of expertise is needed to tailor solutions to a wide range
of property types, secondly, economies of scale are difﬁcult to
generate as each property requires differing measures, and thirdly,
high levels of investment are needed to research and develop so-
lutions which can cater to differing property types [13].
In attempting to produce a universal ‘Golden Rule’, the GD
speciﬁed particular technologies and measures which were
deemed ﬁnancially suitable to certain properties. This provided a
more streamlined method of assessment and property catego-
risation. Furthermore, the GD had the advantage of being able to
adapt to an evolving market. This dynamism meant that if modi-
ﬁcations occurred to existing technologies or more cost effective
solutions arose, or indeed if higher energy costs brought more
expensive mechanisms under the Golden Rule, the roster of mea-
sures could evolve [60]. This drive for products to become more
economical, to enable access to the GD system, meant the policy
had the effect of incentivising industry. This motivation had the
potential to produce the development of lower cost technologies or
provide cheaper ﬁnance, permitting the opportunity to apply a
product to the mass market. This is an advantage over the CERT and
CESP mechanisms which due to higher level public and Energy
Company funded subsidisation (Table 1), brought complacency and
retention of product costs [20]. However, for this GD design towork
successfully, it must have operated a process whereby new in-
novations could be swiftly but thoroughly assessed and tested, to
promptly offer as wide a range of products as possible to ensure
that the viable roster of products under the Golden Rule was
maximising possible carbon savings [60]. Furthermore, due to the
need to develop as near to a whole house approach as possible,
ﬁnance tools were required to work outside the standard GD
ﬁnance structure, to enable more costly measures to become viable
to end users. During the initial phases of the GD a £10 million
project was launched to stimulate the development of innovative
products, these technologies were encouraged to emerge from a
consortia of supply chain members, including building owners and
material suppliers [65]. This analysis shows that the need for
innovation is addressed in the GD policy documentation; however,
due to low numbers of retroﬁt projects under the GD, associated
results are lacking. An additional factor exacerbating the factor that
policies can inhibit routes to innovate and evolve is due to the
limited ability of assessment procedures, making accurate calcu-
lations of technology or material performance once in situ difﬁcult.
From this, any calculation made by an assessment procedure such
as the Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP) as with the GD, may
be subject to discrepancies [3]. These differences between the
predicted and actual savings can be due to factors such as thermal
bridges, insulation gaps and increased energy usage post refur-
bishment due to the rebound effect [66,67,71,68], exacerbating the
energy efﬁciency gap [8]. Testing of products assumes ideal
installation and standard conditions; therefore to achieve predicted
savings within a live project is very difﬁcult [69]. Plus with the
rebound effect or take-back effect whereby the impact of lowerenergy costs post retroﬁt alters the end user behaviour. In the case
of inefﬁcient properties they are in the main, under-heated to
provide savings to the occupants [70]; therefore retroﬁtting a
property provides the tenants or homeowners with an attitude to
take-back the energy they have previously refrained from using,
due to ﬁnancial restraints [71]. This factor of end user behaviour is
not to be underestimated as it is calculated that behaviour can have
the same impact on a property as energy efﬁciency technology and
materials [72]. In the case of the GD these human factors were
outside the capabilities of SAP, and therefore retroﬁt measure
implementation may be missed due to inaccurate calculations [73],
or loans supplied via the GD could have been inaccurate [2] due to
the Golden Rule calculations being void.
ECO, due to its emphasis on partnering and bringing together
construction consortiums is achieving signiﬁcant investment via
obligation. Due to the fact obligated parties such as British Gas,
E.ON and EDF [74] are investing ﬁnance to achieve retroﬁt at scale,
EERS sector businesses need to also produce methods and in-
novations which can reduce the per unit cost of retroﬁt to enhance
the economic viability of the industry. This volume of property
numbers under ECO is evident in the fact that during the period
January 2013 to July 2015, over 1.5 million measures were retro-
ﬁtted [63]. Furthermore, as ECO has a focus on tackling the issues of
hard to treat properties, process and product innovation is
encouraged, to attempt to deal with property type variances.
However, there is also the impact of ECO focusing on higher cost
measures meaning that low cost products, which policy anticipates
to be used under the GD, are not beneﬁtting from the volume of
projects stated above. Similarly to the GD, ECO does have provisions
to encourage investment and innovation, however in the limited
areas where ECO is focused; addressing the heterogeneity of the
entire UK housing stock is not taking place.
CERT addressed property variances by promoting collaborative
working between differing types of businesses and groups,
encouraging innovation. This approach produced pioneering
methods speciﬁcally designed for a certain house or development
type [20]. CESP achieved this, but on a smaller scale, due to the
lower volume of properties, and due to a reduced number of
property and occupant types. In providing free or heavily sub-
sidisedmeasures, CERTand CESP did however to an extent generate
a false market for both suppliers and end users. Providers became
overly reliant on large sums of subsidisation money (Table 1) and
due to the consumer gaining the retroﬁt for free, or at a heavily
subsidised rate; the incentive to innovate was reduced. This effect
was a driving factor within the design of the subsequent GD, which
focused on private businesses undertaking policy implementation,
reducing the burden on public funds.
5.5. Business inability to remove inertia and entrenched routines
Entrenched routines and habits may also limit retroﬁt levels, as
people may not be willing to disrupt their daily lives or surround-
ings [75]. These routines are difﬁcult to break and may cause issues
of energy inefﬁciency to be simply avoided or ignored [15], limiting
the supply of properties for retroﬁt. Furthermore, bounded ratio-
nality can cause a reduction in the number of households making
rational economic decisions to have their property retroﬁtted. This
can cause energy efﬁciency measures to not be undertaken, even
though improvements may be economically proﬁtable and rational
[12]. This can be due to energy efﬁciency decisions requiring
complex problem solving to achieve optimisation, or the fact that
multiple actors within a household inhibit a rational decision to be
made [15].
Although, marketing under-investment from public sources
limits public awareness, in concept the GD did remove inertia and
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livery programme within which accredited EERS sector businesses
must have complied. Both the GD and the sister policy the Energy
Company Obligation (ECO) placed the responsibility of delivery on
energy companies and GD providers [27], therefore limiting end
user involvement, and in turn the amount of awareness and
knowledge required. Nevertheless, in solely focusing on fabric im-
provements the GD and ECO could have missed an opportunity to
address the factor of behaviour in energy consumption [3], which
could leave the impacts of the rebound effect remaining [76].
What is more, the carrot that was provided via the scheme
(ﬁnancing of measures) did not completely remove the ﬁnancial
barrier to energy efﬁciency upgrades. There is concern that due to
limited government support for the scheme (Table 1), the interest
rates did not make the privately funded retroﬁt loans very attrac-
tive to possible clients [77]. This high price for the loan was exac-
erbated by private businesses being reluctant to lend money
without the government underwriting the loan. Therefore not only
are the beneﬁts uncertain due to the inaccuracies discussed pre-
viously around the SAP assessment procedure, but in addition, the
loan ﬁnance could have been sourced in a muchmore cost effective
manner, in the form of a mortgage for instance. In addition to this
unattractive ﬁnance package, the GD also failed to address the ways
in which end user behaviour looks to minimise the level of
disruption. In the case of a loan funded retroﬁt, many home owners
and tenants simply see the exercise as a large amount of upheaval
from existing routines for only a potential marginal economic re-
turn. From this standpoint therefore, in many ways the GD could
have been seen to be an irrational choice for end users, and also a
tough sale for EERS sector businesses, even though the scheme was
designed to appeal to rational economic thinking [78].
In the case of CERT and CESP, to ensure suppliers met their
quota, and to avoid subsequent ﬁnancial penalties, retroﬁt mea-
sures were offered at a signiﬁcantly subsidised rate to promote
uptake [20]. This in turn removed the ﬁnancial barrier encouraging
inertia. However, in providing free or highly subsidised retroﬁt
measures, there is the effect that end users do not appreciate the
full value of the property improvements. This hinders the possi-
bility of behavioural changes, meaning the full potential savings of
retroﬁt works may go unrealised. In addition, for CERT, the factor
that ad hoc changes were made to the availability of differing
measures under the scheme exacerbated the effect of bounded
rationality and decision complexity for end users [19]. Therefore
with a wider range of measures, EERS sector engagement with
customers may have been more effective.
Due to the restricted geographical areas inwhich CESP operated,
engagement and inertia removal was selective andwas restricted to
a few speciﬁc postcodes with deﬁned socio-demographic param-
eters. Nevertheless, due to energy efﬁciency providers primarily
engaging with social housing organisations, the need to remove
end user inertia and bounded rationality was not present [22]. This
evidently streamlined the EERS sector's delivery in those areas, and
ensured the supply of properties was present, even if there was a
missed opportunity to address occupant behaviours.6. Discussion
The overall outcome of the research is represented by Fig. 1; this
graph serves as a central point for this research and represents the
overall contribution of the policy assessment and policy learning.
To generate a relative ranking of policy ability to remove barriers,
the differing mechanisms discussed here are graded from 1 to 4,
dependant of the extent to which barriers halting retroﬁt at scale
are dealt with. These grades are deﬁned as follows:1. Barrier un-tackled
2. Weak (barrier partly addressed)
3. Moderate (tackling of barrier explicit in policy documentation,
but with limited associated results)
4. Strong (barrier tackled with associated results)
The ﬁve areas where policy needs to be effective to enable
retroﬁt sector growth are given below as points on the radar graph
(Fig. 1). Each barrier is numbered (5.1, 5.2 etc.) corresponding to
Section 5 of this paper.
Based on the review of policies undertaken in Section 5, one
may conclude that the public knowledge of retroﬁt and its beneﬁts
can be increased with tailored forms of information provision and a
focus on fostering transparent, informative business/client re-
lationships. In the case of the GD and ECO, policy design highlights
the requirement of tailored marketing, and stipulates that via the
use of many differing types of EERS sector business in policy de-
livery, awareness generation across differing social groups could be
expected. In theory this policy blueprint is positive in providing
economically encouraging methods to create an energy aware so-
ciety. However, as associated results have not materialised from
this method, results here indicate that increased emphasis of public
as well as private methods may be useful. This means the GD and
ECO score a ‘3’ in this study (Fig. 1), as there is a moderate tackling
of information and awareness barriers. Research here indicates that
in the case with CERT, innovative partnerships across public and
private boundaries, ﬁnanced by a larger public and obligation fund
(Table 1), in comparison to the GD and ECO provided increased
levels of engagement with the public. Therefore, an emphasis on
not limiting the types of delivery methods used, as CERT does,
could provide a market focused on providing tailored solutions, to
differing social groups. This success in uptake appears to show that
the methods utilised in lead generation were effective, offering
supporting results to the policy documentation, giving CERT a score
of ‘4’ (Fig. 1). It is also acknowledged here however, that to enable
these innovative types of partnerships, CERT did have to input
greater levels of public funding than within the GD framework.
From an opposite perspective the apparent weak effectiveness in
producing awareness increases on the ground means that CESP
scores ‘2’ in Fig. 1. Although successful in generating retroﬁt at scale
within certain postcodes, following up retroﬁt work with
comprehensive education is deemed to be required.
Furthermore, the fact that the EERS sector is in many ways a
development of the traditional construction sector, means that a
policy emphasis upon setting priorities which support market
growth, investor risk limitation, and innovation encouragement are
considered to be required to increase growth to provide retroﬁt at a
signiﬁcantly larger scale. Although it is considered that the GD
attempted to create an EERS sector environment which demanded
growth and innovation, there appeared to be issues that the GD
required high growth rates in the short term. The costs impacting
EERS sector stakeholders due to these expectations meant that the
policy did not explicitly provide measures to assist businesses in
this matter, even though the accreditation scheme aided cost
reduction. This means the GD scores ‘2’ in this study for hidden cost
removal (Fig. 1). The impact of the hidden costs on these expanding
businesses is also an issue for ECO, as although the brokerage
platform is designed to remove transaction costs, uncertainty in the
format has seemingly resulted in stalling from businesses to limit
risk. ECO's performance therefore produces a score of ‘3’ (Fig. 1) due
to the provision of barrier removal by the brokerage, but without
extensive associated results. This uncertainty of policy details was
also considered a determinant of the success of CERT. Within policy
documentation there is a provision for an environment whereby



























Fig. 1. Radar Chart detailing barrier removal capabilities of the GD, ECO, CERT and CESP.
L. Gooding, M.S. Gul / Energy Strategy Reviews 11-12 (2016) 29e40 37policy changes and inter-business competition, signiﬁcant results
of hidden cost removal did not appear to materialise, resulting in a
‘3’ score here (Fig. 1). CESP represents a case of utilising existing
systems, and although operating at a smaller scale to the other
policies considered here, it does characterise a method of limiting
risk by working with present tools. Therefore, one method to create
retroﬁt at scale would be to build on present supply chain conﬁg-
urations, as opposed to implementing an entire new paradigm.
However, even with the use of tried and tested methods, CESP via
its lack of certainty, caused delivery chains to encounter additional
hidden costs to provide commercial risk aversion, causing an
absence of associated results and therefore a score of ‘3’ (Fig. 1).
For a business attempting tomaximise proﬁt from operating in a
sector under the inﬂuence of a dynamic policy landscape, adopting
the correct business structure is believed to be vital. Within the
policies reviewed here, two central factors are considered impor-
tant in the production of effective policy schemes. Firstly, to create a
reputable delivery structure, accreditation schemes are required,
such as within the GD and ECO. ECO therefore scores highly (4) on
the radar graph (Fig. 1) for the removal of organisational barriers,
due to the creation of an environment which fosters retroﬁt at
volume through correct investment and supply chain organisation.
The GD on the other hand scores ‘3’ (Fig. 1), for the same reasoning,
but the lack of associated results causes the lower score. Innovation
is considered also to be a requirement needed to be encouraged via
policy, to increase the ability of technological and techniques
designed to tackle retroﬁt projects. This appeared to be particularly
evident within the CERT system, which removed constraints to
business practice, generating a score of ‘4’ (Fig. 1). Lastly, to galva-
nise the efforts of business, a certain level of obligation needs to be
introduced, to both public and private stakeholders, this could be to
drive training schemes forward, or to increase investment in
partnerships and technology research. Evidence reviewed here
appears to show that CESP leaves the barrier of hidden costs hin-
dering retroﬁt at scale un-tackled, and therefore scores ‘1’ in this
study.
Policy mechanisms to encourage investment and thus innova-
tion growth, in terms of this study have been structured around the
central issue of adaptation. To ensure effective innovations have
maximum impact upon the UK housing stock, a ﬂexible approach todiffering products and processes is deemed to be required, ensuring
that policy is driving the research and development within the
sector. This ﬂexibility in permitted measures also needs to be
extended to the types of ﬁnance packages available for any
particular retroﬁt scheme. Although the GD to an extent adopts this
ﬂexibility, attention is required to encourage more innovative de-
livery partnerships. This analysis shows that GD policy documen-
tation addresses this, but due to present low numbers of retroﬁt
projects the policy only scores ‘3’ here due to a lack of connected
results (Fig. 1). Similarly to the GD, ECO does have provisions to
encourage investment and innovation, however in the limited areas
where ECO is focused; according to evidence here UK housing stock
heterogeneity has not been addressed. This results in a score of ‘3’
here (Fig. 1). Although CERT was successful in structuring a market
place where new working relationships were encouraged, for pol-
icy learning to occur and for a whole house retroﬁt focus to prevail,
a compromise is considered to be requiredwhereby an overreliance
upon subsidy doesn't occur. As documented here, not only did CERT
cost the government more to implement (Table 1), it also produced
a false market, whereby natural market drivers and innovationwas
affected. Nevertheless, this approach produced innovative methods
speciﬁcally designed for a certain type of house or development
(ERA, 2011), scoring the policy ‘4’ in this study. CESP on the other
hand is considered to only weakly deal with the barrier, with
subsidies limitingmarket drive to innovate resulting in a score of ‘2’
(Fig. 1).
In producing policy mechanisms to ensure the continuous and
sustainable supply of properties, the need to ensure members of
the public are fully informed regarding policy beneﬁts is believed
important. From the policies considered here, the most effective
mechanism is that of removing the involvement of end users all
together, as CESP did. This provided a streamlining of the supply of
retroﬁt measures, providing associated results, scoring CESP ‘4’ in
this review (Fig. 1). However, this method could not be rolled out
nationally as it only applies to socially deprived households. ECO
also achieves a score of ‘4’ here (Fig. 1), linking the high volume of
results with a delivery system taking the emphasis away from end
users. For both the GD and CERT, without a policy which provides
high levels of marketing, certainty in structure, appealing ﬁnance
deals, and an addressing of end user behaviour, a high volume
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inadequately addresses the issue of generating an EERS sector
which promotes the removal of inertia; its theoretical seamless
delivery system is hindered by a low appeal loan system, meaning
the barrier remains only weakly tackled, scoring the GD ‘2’ (Fig. 1).
Plus, CERT only weakly addresses the need to encourage a sus-
tainable supply of properties for retroﬁt. Due to the apparent
limited emphasis upon end user engagement and encouragement
of the supply chain to produce newmethods of property supply, the
policy scores ‘2’ here (Fig. 1).
Overall, this review of the varying policy schemes, in relation to
barrier removal (Fig. 1), produced the following scores (Table 3) for
each mechanism:Table 3
Overall performance score for each policy.




CESP 15 3This ranking of the policies, displays that schemes which have
such characteristics as ECO and CERT harbour the greatest oppor-
tunity to remove barriers and promote EERS sector growth
(Table 3). Mechanisms which incorporate the mandatory nature of
obligation schemes, linked in with those schemes which provide
space for innovative ideas to foster, in how to operate and also in
what products to supply, are shown in this research to provide the
most rewarding results. These results are not simply in terms of
proﬁt and volume of retroﬁt completed, but also the degree of EERS
sector ability progress, and the level in which policies are priori-
tising the most vulnerable households. This is important to note, as
volume of retroﬁt measures completed will increase with a rise in
government ﬁnancial assistance, as with CERT versus the GD for
example, therefore it is important to disconnect the results here
with simply the amount of money spent, and instead look at the
level of progress made in terms of supply chain capabilities, effec-
tiveness of carbon savings, and end user engagement.
7. Conclusion
Overall to achieve high participation, innovative instruments
are required which capture the interest of both industry actors and
end users. The evolving policy landscape discussed here shows
certain barriers are being addressed by the differing policies.
However, even these mechanisms which have produced signiﬁcant
carbon savings in places are still considered inadequate by many
commentators. For instance, ﬂexibility from policies to enable
homeowners to choose to take retroﬁt project further to deeper
levels has yet to occur. The standpoint of policies to focus on sin-
gular measures enables an increase in the level of properties able to
be retroﬁtted, but it does neglect those households which wish to
pursue greater carbon and energy savings.
The GD with its ambitious expectation of private industry
generating its own leads and providing a growing diverse market
did, in its intentions, encompass the needs of both private business
and end users. However, due to the lack of obligation or regulation,
and minimal government ﬁnancial assistance, high levels of infor-
mation provision and private ﬁnance did not materialise. This
obligatory nature of policy is evident within the three other policies
considered here, and although these schemes achieve a higher level
of retroﬁt, the concept of enabling deeper retroﬁt projects viapolicy, with an understanding of how building physics operate and
how differing measures interact with each other, are not priori-
tised. Therefore an emphasis on the long term impact of a retroﬁt
project is required. This focus on linking property to occupants
highlights the need to place as much importance on the EERS sector
ability to install and provide quality retroﬁt as educating and
increasing awareness and public knowledge.
This review of UK past and present policies, produces a timeline
of impacts retroﬁt policy has had upon the EERS sector within the
UK. In evaluating these policies, attention is clearly required in
viewing how differing policy tools interact with and impact supply
chains and end users from differing angles. Adopting this stand-
point could enable a smooth customer journey to increase energy
efﬁciency and enable a heightened level of awareness. To corrob-
orate these results further primary research of on the ground
sources regarding practitioner experience of the policy schemes
could enable increased insight and enhanced indication as towhere
policy should be moving to.References
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